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SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
Roy R. RAY LECTURE
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
TIME OF WAR
Geoffrey R. Stone*
UR subject is the freedom of the press in wartime. This is an
issue that should be of considerable interest at the moment, if for
no other reason than that the Bush administration has suggested
a possible criminal prosecution of the New York Times for publishing in-
formation relating to the National Security Agency ("NSA") surveillance
program. Should that come to pass, it would be the first time in Ameri-
can history that a newspaper has been prosecuted by the federal govern-
ment for publishing confidential government information.
I begin with history, because it is important to understand the context
in which issues like the NSA surveillance controversy arise. As members
of the legal profession, you have a special responsibility to protect our
nation's liberties. To meet that responsibility, you must master the les-
sons of the past. By understanding the past, you can at least hope to
avoid repeating the errors of your predecessors. Our nation's experience
with freedom of the press in wartime has been uneven, at best.
I will briefly address five episodes in American history, and then turn
to the present. The first of these episodes was scarred by the Sedition Act
of 1798. In the closing years of the eighteenth century, less than a decade
after the United States adopted the First Amendment, which prohibits
Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press," Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1798, which effectively
made it a crime for any person to utter or publish any criticism of the
president, the Congress, or the government of the United States, with the
intent to bring them into contempt or disrepute. It is difficult to imagine
a law that would seem more clearly to abridge "the freedom of speech, or
of the press." How did this happen?
Although the framers of the Constitution did not anticipate the growth
of political parties, they were very concerned about the risk of faction.
* Geoffrey R. Stone is the Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law
at the University of Chicago. This address was delivered as the Roy R. Ray Lecture at the
Southern Methodist University School of Law on April 4, 2006. Mr. Stone's remarks are
drawn from Geoffrey R. Stone, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
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Both the separation of powers and the guarantees of individual liberties
in the Bill of Rights were designed to minimize the danger that one politi-
cal group or faction would be able to impose its will on the nation. But
political parties began to arise as early as Washington's first term, as com-
peting interest groups-rural v. urban, North v. South, mercantile v. agra-
rian-coalesced into two sharply divergent parties. It is important to
remember that although we today take the stability of our democracy
largely for granted, in the early years of the nation there was no such
confidence. Many, perhaps most, citizens believed that the experiment of
the United States was just that-an experiment. The Federalist Party, led
by Hamilton and Adams, and the Republican Party, led by Jefferson and
Madison, had very different visions of the nation and its future. They
viewed each other with suspicion and animosity, and in the presidential
election of 1796, the Federalist candidate, John Adams, defeated the Re-
publican candidate, Thomas Jefferson, by a scant three electoral votes.
The distrust and hostility between the parties threatened to split the
nation.
While all this was simmering, a war raged in Europe between France
and England. The Federalists identified with England, the Republicans
with France. The United States tried to maintain a position of neutrality,
but by 1798 the nation had effectively aligned itself with England. The
Federalists, who controlled the White House, the Congress, and the judi-
ciary, warned that war with France was imminent. Claiming that the na-
tion needed to prepare for war, President Adams asked Congress to
expand the army and navy, abrogate existing treaties with France, and
enact the Sedition Act of 1798. The Republicans argued that the pro-
posed Act violated the First Amendment. The Federalists responded that
whatever might be the case in peacetime, in time of war the nation had to
be united. Criticism of the nation's leaders would undermine confidence
and threaten our ability to fight effectively. War was no time to allow
division and distrust. The Federalists had the votes, and the Sedition Act
of 1798 was quickly enacted and signed into law by President Adams.
Federalist prosecutors and judges aggressively used the Act to silence
the Republicans. Every prosecution under the Sedition Act targeted
members and supporters of the Republican Party, and a particular target
of these prosecutions was the Republican press. The press of this era was
quite different from the mainstream media of today. Newspapers were
highly partisan, and often existed principally to advance the interests of a
particular political party. The government prosecuted the editors of the
leading Republican newspapers, and succeeded in jailing many Republi-
can editors and closing at least temporarily many Republican newspa-
pers. Such statements as Adams has caused the nation to have "to
borrow money at eight per cent" or that he had contrived "a French war,
an American navy, a large standing army, an additional load of taxes, and
all the other symptoms and consequences of debt and despotism" landed
Republican editors in prison. The goal of these prosecutions had little to
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do with the danger of war with France and everything to do with the
prospects of the Federalist Party in the election of 1800. The Federalists
used the threat of war as a pretext to enact legislation that could then be
used to perpetuate themselves in power.
The effort failed. The American people were so furious about the Se-
dition Act that they voted the Federalists and Adams out of office and
elected the Republicans and Jefferson. This was one of the few times in
American history when the American people saw through the manipula-
tion of a wartime atmosphere in order to protect their own liberties. As it
turned out, by the way, no war with France ever materialized. A critical
lesson of this early experience is the need to be skeptical about govern-
ment efforts to suppress freedom of the press in order to protect the na-
tional security. It is quite natural for a nation's leaders, intentionally or
unintentionally, to confuse the national security with partisan self-inter-
est. Sadly, this pattern has repeated over and over again since 1798.
The next episode is the Civil War. The Civil War presented the great-
est challenge the United States has ever faced. The often desperate situa-
tion of the Union led President Lincoln and his military commanders to
take a number of desperate measures, including suspensions of the writ of
habeas corpus, enactment of the nation's first conscription law, and issu-
ance of the Emancipation Proclamation. There was sharp disagreement,
even within the Union, about the merits of the war, about whether the
North should just let the South go in peace, about whether preserving the
Union was worth the staggering cost in human lives, about whether the
Emancipation Proclamation was constitutional, about the administra-
tion's often brutal efforts to enforce the draft, and about Lincoln's sus-
pensions of the writ of habeas corpus. At various times, Lincoln himself
was accused in the press of being a "despot," a "liar," a "usurper," a
"thief," a "monster," a "perjurer," an "ignoramus," a "swindler," a "ty-
rant," a "fiend," a "butcher," and a "pirate," among other things. Indeed,
he was the most vilified President in history.
During the Civil War more than 300 opposition newspapers in the
North were shut down by the government and many editors were jailed
for publishing "disloyal" speech. These actions were taken not by the
courts in ordinary criminal prosecutions, but by military commanders act-
ing pursuant to either martial law or under Lincoln's suspensions of the
writ of habeas corpus. The most dramatic example involved former con-
gressman Clement Vallandigham, a national leader of the Peace Demo-
crats, who was arrested in Ohio by General Ambrose Burnsides for
delivering a public speech criticizing Lincoln and his administration. A
military tribunal found that Vallandigham had engaged in a "disloyal act"
and ordered him imprisoned for the remainder of the war. Val-
landigham's arrest triggered major protests throughout the North, leading
Lincoln to cancel Vallandigham's imprisonment, instead ordering him ex-
iled to the Confederacy.
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During World War I, President Wilson had a problem. A large part of
the American public was not enthusiastic about our entry into the war.
Unlike World War II, the United States had not been attacked before
World War I. Moreover, Woodrow had won reelection in 1916 on the
campaign slogan, "He kept us out of war." Nonetheless, within a year he
had decided that it was necessary for the United States to enter the war.
The trigger for that decision was Wilson's frustration with Germany's use
of submarine warfare to sink American merchant ships that were bring-
ing supplies to England and France. Wilson had warned Germany that if
it continued these attacks the United States would protect its interests
under international law. Many Americans thought the better course was
for the United States to stop trading with the belligerants and avoid get-
ting embroiled in the war. As some people put it, this was not a war "to
make the world safe for democracy," as Wilson described it, but a war "to
make the world safe for the munitions manufacturers and arms dealers."
Facing a skeptical and often hostile public, Wilson needed both to gen-
erate a sense of enthusiasm for the war and to silence those who criticized
it. To achieve the former, he created the Committee on Public Informa-
tion, a propaganda agency operating directly out of the White House.
Wilson directed the CPI to produce a flood of pamphlets, movies, posters,
editorials, and lectures to promote a hatred of all things German and to
foster suspicion of any person not fully committed to the war effort.
(This is a bit like what the Bush administration has done in Iraq by ar-
ranging for Iraqi newspapers and radio and television stations to report
stories actually written by American public relations firms in order to
influence Iraqi public opinion-without disclosing the source of the sto-
ries.) The CPI spewed government propaganda into the American politi-
cal system, with devastating effect.
But all the efforts of the CPI would be futile if critics could continue to
challenge the government's case for the war. Wilson needed to stifle
those who opposed his policies. To this end, he proposed the enactment
of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918. In effect,
these two laws made it unlawful for any person to write or publish any
statement that criticized the President, the Congress, the government, the
Constitution, the war, the draft, the military, or the uniform of the mili-
tary of the United States. In effect, the government reenacted the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798. But whereas the 1798 act had a maximum penalty of
two years in prison, the World War I statutes carried penalties ranging up
to twenty years in prison. Most people convicted under these acts were
sentenced to terms ranging from ten to twenty years in prison. During
World War I, some 2000 individuals were prosecuted under these laws,
including not only individual speakers, but publishers of newspapers and
magazines.
One of the most famous cases involved The Masses, a revolutionary
journal published in the mid-to-late teens that included brilliant artwork
and such gifted writers as Sherwood Anderson, John Reed, and Emma
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Goldman. Because The Masses took a staunchly an anti-war stance, Al-
bert Burleson, the postmaster general of the United States excluded the
August 1917 issue of The Masses from the mails. Thereafter, the publish-
ers and editors of The Masses were prosecuted and sentenced to prison
for their criticism of the war and the draft. During World War I, Burleson
banned more than a hundred newspapers and magazines from the mails.
Moreover, among the 2,000 individuals and organizations prosecuted
under the Espionage and Sedition Acts were dozens of editors and pub-
lishers. Even movie producers were targeted. Robert Goldstein pro-
duced "The Spirit of '76," a movie about the American Revolution. "The
Spirit of '76" depicted the standard stories about the American Revolu-
tion (Washington crossing the Delaware, Valley Forge, etc.). But it also
depicted a massacre by British soldiers of women and children. Because
of that scene, which accurately depicted the event, Goldstein was prose-
cuted under the Espionage Act and sentenced to ten years in prison.
It was these prosecutions during World War I that gave the Supreme
Court its first opportunity to interpret the First Amendment. The Court
consistently upheld these convictions, explaining that at least in wartime
the freedom of the press may be sharply restricted. The Court held that
the government could constitutionally prohibited the publication of any
material that had the tendency to cause readers to turn against the war,
because they might then be inclined to refuse induction into the military,
be insubordinate, or decline to buy war bonds. The effect was the squelch
any criticism of the war or the draft.
In World War II, the major civil liberties issue was the Japanese intern-
ment, which did not involve the freedom of the press. Because the
United States was directly attacked at Pearl Harbor, for the most part the
public and the press rallied to the cause in World War II. There was little
dissent. But there was some, and those who dissented during World War
II were treated no better than those who had preceded them. The best
example was William Dudley Pelley, a self-proclaimed Nazi who de-
scribed himself as the "American Hitler." In his own way, Pelley was
quite an interesting character. He was a screenwriter in Hollywood who
had written several award-winning short stories. In the 1930s, he founded
the Silver Shirts, the largest and most potent Nazi-like organization in the
United States. His newspaper, the Galilean, was widely disseminated.
After we entered World War II, Pelley published a series of articles in the
Galilean that were sharply critical of Roosevelt and his "Zionist" advis-
ers. Pelley charged that Roosevelt had led the nation into bankruptcy,
manipulated the Japanese into attacking the United States, failed to pro-
tect the United States against the attack at Pearl Harbor, and misled the
American people about the extent of damage to the United States fleet at
Pearl Harbor. Pelly also asserted that many Americans were critical of
our involvement in World War II and that the losses suffered by the En-
glish in the South Pacific doomed the Allied cause in the war. President
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Roosevelt ordered Attorney General Francis Biddle to prosecute Pelley
under the Espionage Act of 1917.
Significantly, though, the United States prosecuted Pelley under the
false statement provisions of the Act. The defendants in World War I
prosecutions had been convicted without regard to whether their state-
ments were true. By the 1940s, however, the government no longer
thought it could (or should) convict individuals for criticizing the war un-
less their criticisms included false statements of fact. This was a major
step forward in our First Amendment traditions. Unfortunately, Pelley
was convicted even though his statements were clearly statements of
opinion, rather than false statements of fact. To prove that Pelley's state-
ments were false, the government went to such lengths as to call a banker
to testify that Roosevelt hadn't bankrupted the nation and a traveling
salesman to testify that almost no one opposed the war. In the midst of
war fever, the jury disregarded the distinction between fact and opinion.
Pelley was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
Another incident in World War II is worthy of mention. The Chicago
Tribune, which was very critical of Roosevelt, published information after
the Battle of Midway from which one could reasonably infer that the
United States had broken Japan's secret code. Understandably, the gov-
ernment was furious with the Tribune for this breach of national security
and considered prosecuting the Tribune for publishing such information.
Ultimately, though, the government decided to forego prosecution be-
cause the Japanese apparently hadn't noticed the Tribune story.
During the Vietnam War, the single most important conflict between
the press and the government involved the publication of the Pentagon
Papers. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had commissioned a
7000 page secret study that traced the history of United States policy to-
ward Vietnam from the end of World War II to 1967. Daniel Ellsberg, a
former employee of the Department of Defense, leaked a copy of the
Pentagon Papers to the New York Times. Because the study included
critical information about how the government had deceived the Ameri-
can people about the nation's involvement in Vietnam, the New York
Times began publishing excerpts from the Pentagon Papers. The Depart-
ment of Justice promptly sought an injunction against further publication.
The case quickly worked it way up to the Supreme Court, which held that
the injunction violated the First Amendment, even though the govern-
ment had claimed that continued publication would seriously threaten the
national security. The Court held that even though the danger was real, it
was not sufficiently clear, present, and grave to justify the issuance of an
injunction against publication. This was a profound victory for the free-
dom of the press.
By the time of the Pentagon Papers decision, American law and culture
had evolved to the point that the very idea of enjoining the press for
publishing such material or criminally prosecuting the press for criticizing
the wartime decisions of the government was simply unthinkable. That
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view reflects our current conception of the freedom of the press. It is
essential to realize, however, that this conception is a very recent devel-
opment in American history. It is only over the past forty years that the
United States has embraced the notion that the press can openly and
freely criticize the government in wartime. For the vast majority of our
history, that was not the case.
There are at least two important lessons we must learn from this his-
tory. First, it is important to know that we as a nation can learn from our
mistakes. Looking back, we can see that we have repeatedly overreacted
to the dangers of wartime, suppressed public debate on critical issues of
public policy, and dangerously censored dissent and disagreement under
the guise of protecting the national security. Second, it is important to
acknowledge that the progress we have made is fragile. It would not take
much to upset the current understanding of the First Amendment. As
Justice Holmes warned, we must be eternally vigilant if we are to pre-
serve our freedoms.
The precariousness of our commitment to the freedom of the press is
illustrating by the ongoing investigations and threatened prosecutions
arising out the publication by the New York Times and Washington Post
of classified government information disclosing to the American people
the National Security Agency's secret electronic surveillance program
and the CIA's secret prisons. President Bush and others have decried
these publications as shameful, investigations are underway to determine
the source of the leaks, and the government has threatened to initiate
criminal prosecutions of the press for publishing confidential government
information for the first time in American history.
Serious issues remain unresolved: (1) Could the United States have
criminally prosecuted Daniel Ellsberg for leaking the Pentagon Papers?
Although the government initiated such a prosecution, it was dismissed
for government misconduct. But the question remains: When, if ever, do
public employees have a constitutional right to leak classified information
to the press? (2) Could the United States have criminally prosecuted the
New York Times for publishing the Pentagon Papers? Although the Pen-
tagon Papers decision held that the government could not constitutionally
enjoin further publication, it did not address the question of a criminal
prosecution for knowingly publishing classified information. When, if
ever, can the government prosecute the press for publishing classified in-
formation? (3) Does the press have a First Amendment right to demand
access to information from the government? In an era in which the na-
tional government has begun ever more secretive, how are the American
people to exercise their rights as self-governors if they are kept in the
dark about the policies and decisions of their own representatives? (4)
Do reporters have a First Amendment right to protect the identity of
their confidential sources? If not, will those who know about government
abuses of authority disclose that information to the press?
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These are fundamental questions that will shape the balance between
national security and freedom of the press. At times, I hear people say
that this is the most oppressive period in American history. Those who
say that know nothing of American history. But it is also true that all is
not well. Although we have secured a much greater right to criticize our
government than ever before, we now face the challenge of gaining access
to the information that is necessary to make that criticism meaningful.
There can be no accountability and no oversight if the government can
effectively shield its decisions from public scrutiny. There can be no
meaningful debate about such issues as torture, secret prisons, and elec-
tronic surveillance if the government hides such practices from the press
and the public.
Censorship is one way to stifle and distort public debate. Keeping the
public ignorant of the government's actions is another. Consider the gov-
ernment's policy of preventing anyone to photograph the flag-draped cof-
fins of American soldiers killed in Iraq. By denying the press access to
such scenes, the government is effectively censorship public discourse in
an effort to manipulate public understanding of the consequences of the
war in Iraq. First Amendment doctrine has been designed primarily to
deal with the issue of censorship. But in the twenty-first century, we in-
creasingly must grapple with the issue of access.
I want to leave you with two concluding observations. First, although
we should be proud of the progress we have made in expanding the free-
dom of the press even in wartime, we cannot afford to be complacent. If
we had had two or three or six 9/1Is within a month or six months of the
attack on the World Trade Center, all of our thinking about these issues
would be very different. To some extent, it would be legitimate for our
thinking to be different. The degree of danger that confronts the nation
is relevant. But it is also essential to keep in mind that our history
teaches just how fragile our rights really are. It would not take much to
put them seriously at risk.
Finally, I want to emphasize that it is critical to think about these ques-
tions before rather than after the fact. If we wait until the crisis is on us,
it will be very hard to think clearly. To protect our freedoms in time of
crisis, it is imperative that we define those freedoms clearly and defini-
tively when we can think about them calmly. If we wait until the day after
the next attack to think seriously about these issues, we will surely repli-
cate the errors of the past.
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